Abstract-A proxy signature scheme is a variant of digital signature scheme in which a signer delegates his signing rights to another person called proxy signer, so that the proxy signer can generate the signature of the actual signer in his absence. Self Proxy Signature (SPS) is a type of proxy signature wherein, the original signer delegates the signing rights to himself (Self Delegation), there by generating temporary public and private key pairs for himself. Thus, in SPS the user can prevent the exposure of his private key from repeated use. In this paper, we propose the first identity based self proxy signature scheme. We give a generic scheme and a concrete instantiation in the identity based setting. We have defined the appropriate security model for the same and proved both the generic and identity based schemes in the defined security model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of proxy signature schemes dates back to 1996, proposed by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in their seminal paper [14] . In proxy signature scheme, a user Alice, called the original signer delegates her signing rights to another user Bob, called the proxy signer. A verifier can distinguish between a normal signature and a proxy signature but then is convinced that the message is authenticated by Alice. Proxy signatures have a number of applications, including e-commerce, mobile agents and distributed shared objects. The original signer Alice sends a signature on the message warrant which consists the rules governing the delegation to Bob the proxy signer. Bob can now generate a new proxy private key with the help of Alice and sign on behalf of Alice. In 1998, Oded Goldreich, Birgit Pfitzmann and Ronald L. Rivest [5] introduced delegation schemes where a user delegates certain rights to himself. Their motivation was, even though a user has a long-term permanent key, which is used to receive some personalized access rights, the user may wish to delegate these rights to a new temporary possibly short-term keys which he creates to use on his laptop when on travel, to avoid having to store his primary secret key on the vulnerable laptop. They have succeeded without relying on special-purpose (e.g., tamper-proof) hardware installed in the laptop and have proposed several schemes. However, their schemes work for signatures in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) setting. In Self Proxy Signature (SPS), a user delegates his signing rights to himself, i.e. the user can generate multiple pairs of temporary public and private keys. The lifetime of the temporary keys can be controlled by creating proper message warrants, depending on the application.
A. Motivation
Self proxy signatures are used in scenarios where the user wants to create new key pairs from the existing key pair. The newly generated key pair is called as "Temporary Key" pair and the existing key pair from which the Temporary key pair is generated is called as "Permanent Key" pair. It is important to note that while permanent key pair is generated by PKG and it is done only once per user, the temporary key pair is generated by the user and can be done any number of times. We explain three situations, where self delegation is useful and these situations commonly arise in practice.
To reduce the probability of exposure of the permanent private key: Nowadays, numerous internet services such as, internet banking, home trading, on-line payments, electronic commercial services and other secure online transactions rely on Public Key Cryptography. Public key cryptography plays an important role in the authentication of users in these systems. This causes a potential security threat, namely "increase in the probability of the permanent private key being exposed". For instance, if the permanent private key is used in an insecure computing environment such as a public PC or a friend's PDA, a malicious program can plunder the private key by searching the memory where the private key is stored, or by hijacking the password for decrypting the enciphered private key. Moreover, this gives room to access any other online services of the user, which rely on this plundered permanent private key. It is to be noted that this situation was discussed in [12] .
To create weak Temporary Keys means less number of bits: This situation is common in secure communication protocols such as SSL/TLS, where the session key exchange between a server and its client is done using Public Key Cryptography. When SSL was designed, United States export regulations limited RSA encryption key lengths to 512 bits for exportable applications. Unfortunately, a 512-bit permanent RSA key presents an attractive target for attack. Thus a server who wish to communicate with both domestic and exportable clients would like to have two keys one with 1024 bits and another key with 512 bits. This feature is called ephemeral RSA and this allows communication between an exportable client and domestic server with permanent strong key. In this scenario, the server generates a temporary 512 bit key which is signed with its strong permanent key.
To significantly improve amortized signature generation and verification cost: Besides the two reasons mentioned above, we show a significant reduction in the total signing cost during the period of validity of temporary keys. For instance, for signing n messages in our scheme we may use (2 + n) or (3 + n) scalar point multiplications. While direct deployment would incur a cost of 2n or 3n point multiplications. More detailed comparisons are done towards the end of this paper.
Related Work: In 1996, Mambo et al introduced the concept of a proxy signature scheme [14] . Since then, many proxy signature schemes have been proposed [9] [11] . The first multi-proxy signature scheme was proposed in 2000 [7] . In a multi-proxy signature scheme, an original signer could authorize a proxy signing group as his proxy agent. The proxy signature on a message on behalf of the original signer can be generated by the group members only if all the members in the proxy signing group cooperate. A contrary concept, proxy multi-signature was introduced by Yi et al. in 2000 [18] . A proxy multi-signature scheme is one in which a designated proxy signer can generate the signature on behalf of a group of original signers. Another kind of proxy signature scheme is multi-proxy multi-signature scheme, proposed by Hwang in [8] .
The concept of identity based cryptography was introduced by Adi Shamir in his seminal work [17] in the year 1984. The core idea of identity based cryptography is to use any arbitrary string that uniquely identifies a user as his public key. Identity based cryptography serves as an efficient alternative to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based systems, where the certificate management and verification of the validity of a user public key are too cumbersome. Although, the concept of self proxy was touched upon by Boldyreva et al. [2] , they are not using any temporary keys for carrying out delegations. Only the permanent keys were used for both original and proxy signing and verification. This is a PKI based system. However, this system is shown to have weaknesses by Malkin et al. [13] and they proposed a new scheme based on key insulated signature schemes. To the best of our knowledge, there is no identity based self delegated signature scheme available in the literature and ours is the first attempt in this direction. Kim et al. [10] have proposed a PKI based self proxy signature scheme.
Our Contribution: Our contribution in this paper is three fold. First, we give a formal security model for identity based self proxy signatures. Next, we show that the scheme by Kim et al. [10] is existentially forgeable and finally, we propose a generic identity based self proxy signature scheme and a concrete instantiation of the same. We formally prove the security of both the generic and concrete schemes in the newly proposed security model. Both our proofs rely on the random oracle assumption.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We review the basic requirements and assumptions used in our paper in this section.
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group generated by P , with prime order q, and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 with the following properties.
• Bilinearity.
, where I G2 is the identity element of G 2 .
• Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
B. Computational Assumptions
In this section, we review the computational assumptions related to bilinear maps that are relevant to the protocols we discuss.
1) Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)::
Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the CDH problem in G 1 is defined as
The CDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv CDH A is negligibly small.
C. Notations:
Q A : An identity based public key of a user with identity ID A . D A : An identity based private key of a user with identity ID A . P A : A non-identity based public key of a user with identity ID A and also Temporary public of the same user. U A : A non-identity based private key of a user with identity ID A and also Temporary private of the same user. P pub : Master public key used by the P KG of the identity based system. σ war : An identity based warrant signature. σ sp : A non-identity based proxy signature. σ: Self proxy signature which is a combination of σ war , σ sp .
III. REVIEW AND WEAKNESS OF SELF PROXY
SIGNATURE SCHEME BY KIM ET AL. [10] We review the scheme due to Kim et al. [10] and propose the weakness of the scheme in this section. Let (x a , y a ) 
A. Weakness of Self Proxy Signature Scheme By Kim et al.
The forger F can produce any number of forged signatures by using a single signature on a message m signed by the original signer. This is shown below:
Let s = k +x p H(m) mod q be the signature on message m, where r = g k mod p, this signature is obtained during the training phase of the forgery game.
The forger F divides the signature component s with H(m) and multiplies it with H(m * ) and thus obtains s
is a valid signature on m * . Hence a forgery.
IV. GENERIC FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY MODEL FOR IDENTITY BASED SPS (IBSPS)
In this section, we give the generic framework and the security model for identity based self proxy signature scheme. The basic idea behind the construction of an Identity Based Self Proxy Signature (IBSPS) scheme is to extract an identity based private key from the PKG and construct a temporary private key / public key pair using the identity based permanent private key and the system parameters. It is to be noted that the temporary key pairs are generated by user without any interaction from the PKG. The PKG works once for each user and generates permanent key of the user. The temporary public key and the warrant details for the session are signed with the identity based private key of the user and the message is signed with the corresponding temporary private key. Thus, the signature on the message consists of two components now; (a) the signature on the message with the temporary private key (b) the identity based signature on the temporary public key and the warrant details.
A. Generic Framework for IBSPS
An identity based self proxy signature scheme consists of the following nine algorithms: Setup, Extract, GenTempKey, WarrantSign, WarrantVerify, ProxySign, ProxyVerify, SPSSign and SPSVerify. The algorithms are described below:
Setup: This is a combination of an identity based system setup and a non-identity based initialize algorithm. The input to this algorithm is the security parameter 1 κ . The PKG run's this algorithm to produce the public parameters params, which is published globally and the master private key M sk, kept secret by the PKG. The public parameters include a master public key P pub , cryptographic hash functions and the definition of the groups used in the scheme.
Extract: This algorithm is executed by the PKG. It is executed once for each user at the time of registration with the PKG. The PKG takes the master private key M sk and the identity ID A of user A as input and computes the private key D A corresponding to the identity ID A .
GenTempKey:
The user who wants to generate temporary private / public key pairs for various sessions executes this algorithm. The algorithm takes params as input and produces the temporary (private key, public key) pair (U A , P A ).
WarrantSign: This algorithm is executed by each user in the system to generate the signature on the message warrant m w , which is publicly verifiable (m w consists of the details regarding the duration of the delegation and the public key for the current duration). The algorithm when executed by user A, takes the user identity ID A , the message warrant m w , temporary public key P A , the corresponding private key D A , and params as input and outputs the identity based signature σ war on the message warrant m w .
WarrantVerify: In order to verify the validity of the message warrant m w , a verifier executes this algorithm. The input to this algorithm are params, the signer identity ID A , the message warrant m w and the signature σ war on m w by the signer. This algorithm returns True if σ war is a valid signature on m w , otherwise returns False.
ProxySign: The input to this algorithm are params, the temporary proxy private key U A and the actual message to be signed m. This algorithm is executed by the signer to generate a signature (σ sp ) on m using the temporary proxy private key generated by the GenTempKey algorithm.
ProxyVerify: The input to this algorithm are params, the signer identity ID A , the temporary public key P A corresponding to user A and the signature σ sp on message m. This algorithm is executed by a verifier who wants to verify the validity of σ sp on m. The output is True if σ sp is a valid signature on m, otherwise outputs False. SPSSign: The self proxy signature generation algorithm is executed by the signer with identity ID A . The input to this algorithm are the identity ID A , the permanent private / public key pair (D A , Q A ), the temporary private / public key pair (U A , P A ), a message warrant m w and the message m to be signed. It is to be noted that σ war is not executed each time during the generation of an SPS but it is executed once for each session and is reused. The signature generation procedure is given below: 
B. Security Model for the Unforgeability of IBSPS
Unforgeability is the most general notion of security for any digital signature scheme. Unforgeability ensures that the digital signature scheme is secure against a forger who can forge the signature of a legitimate user. The stronger notion of unforgeability is existential unforgeability against adaptively chosen messages and identity (only for identity based schemes) attacks. We propose the security model for identity based SPS in this section. The formal definition for the unforgeability of an IBSPS is defined as a game (EUF-IBSPS-CMA) between a challenger C and a forger F described below: Setup Phase: C runs the Setup algorithm with the security parameter 1 κ and sends the system parameters params to F. Training Phase: F performs polynomially bounded number of queries, as described below in an adaptive manner (i.e., each query may depend on the responses to the previous queries). Extract query : F produces an identity ID A as input to this oracle and obtains the identity based private key D A corresponding to the identity ID A from C. GetTempKey query: F produces an identity ID A and receives from C the temporary private, public keys U A and P A corresponding to ID A . 
V. GENERIC IDENTITY BASED SPS SCHEME (Gen IBSP S)
In this section, we propose the generic construction for identity based SPS scheme (Gen IBSP S) and prove the unforgeability of Gen IBSP S. We make use of an identity based signature scheme and a non-identity based signature scheme as the basic building blocks for our generic construction. Let the identity based signature scheme be denoted as IBS = IBS.Setup, IBS.Extract, IBS.Sig, IBS.V er , and the non-identity based signature be denoted as nonIBS = nonIBS.Initialize, nonIBS.KeyGen, nonIBS.Sig, nonIBS.V er .
As security requirements, we require both the schemes, IBS and nonIBS should be existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack. Examples of IBS can be one of the schemes from [4] , [6] , [15] , [1] , [17] and nonIBS can be Schnorr, EC-DSA or BLS [3] signature.
A. The Generic Scheme
As described in the previous section the generic self proxy signature scheme consists of the following nine algorithms: The proof of this theorem appears in the full version of the paper [16] .
VI. A CONCRETE IBSPS SCHEME
In this section, we provide a concrete instantiation of Gen IBSPS scheme and prove the security of the scheme in the proposed security model. We have used a variant of the IBS signature scheme in [15] and the nonIBS scheme in [3] , to construct our concrete IBSPS scheme.
A. The Scheme
The algorithms in the IBSPS scheme are described below: Setup(1 κ ): Let G 1 be an additive group and G 2 be a multiplicative group both of same prime order q. The PKG chooses a generator P ∈ R G 1 , picks three cryptographic hash functions defined as and computing P A = x A P . Now, the temporary private / public key pair of the user is
The warrant signature on the warrant m w is generated as follows.
• Compute R = rP , where r ∈ R Z * q .
• σ war = V war , R, P A is the warrant signature. Note: Warrant signature is independent of the message and hence need to be computed only once for the entire validity period of the warrant. WarrantVerify(m w , ID A , σ war ): Given the identity ID A of the signer, a message warrant m w and a warrant signature σ war on m w , this algorithm returns True if the following check holds; otherwise returns False.
Given a pair of temporary keys P A , U A the self proxy sign on a message m with warrant m w by the user with identity ID A , the proxy signature can be generated as
• σ sp is V sp , α ProxyVerify(m, ID A , P A , σ sp ): Given the Self Proxy signature σ sp and the temporary public key P A check whether: The proof of this theorem appears in the full version of the paper [16] .
VII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the notion of identity based self proxy signature scheme, wherein a signer creates temporary private key / public key pair which is controlled by a corresponding message warrant. The message warrant and the temporary public key are signed with the permanent identity based private key of the signer and the signature on the message is signed with the temporary private key. The temporary private key is revoked in appropriate time intervals. We have given a generic construction for identity based SPS, proposed the formal security model, given a concrete instantiation and proved it in the random oracle model. Several specific schemes can be constructed by choosing a specific identity based scheme for warrant signing and a non-identity based signature scheme for message signing.
